The first big challenge
While the next president is certainly going to inherit a host of problems from W., the mortgage crisis is kind of our first chance to see how the candidates react in “real-time.” They didn’t get to quietly focus group their approach to this problem over 6 months. More importantly, their campaigns were not selected by voters because of this problem (McCain and Obama are still standing in part because of their positions on Iraq vs. other members of their party, so of course those positions are popular).
So how are they doing? According to the NYT, Obama has the “best” plan for dealing with mortgages (see here)– bankruptcy reform. Lest we think the NYT is an Obama stumper, here is their endorsement of Hillary Clinton as their candidate. Lest we think this is just a fluke or happenstance, here is a brief analysis of why Obama’s plan is the best and why the plan proposed by each candidate follows directly from their political approach.
The Problem:
Economic issues are always extremely complicated manifestations of very simple underlying problems. The issue is always some kind of mismatch. Everybody wants something that nobody has or nobody wants something that everyone needs to do something with/be compensated for. The government doesn’t need to step in to correct the mismatch per se, it’s going to be re-balanced one way or another, but the government can influence which of the one or another ways the re-balancing occurs, and these ways have dramatically different social consequences. For example, mismatch in demand for and supply of food can be re-balanced by intelligent distribution schemes or by mass starvation.
The current crisis is based on two mismatches and one basic fact:
1. Lots of people have debts they can’t pay because they own homes on credit terms they can no longer afford.
2. Lots of banks depend on mortgages on their balance sheets to maintain good standing with their financial trading partners. That is, these mortgages help them fill certain requirements.
3. Banks are all tied together. Some banks are better than others, but in the market, even good banks rely on bad banks to make good on their basic promises. Transactions happen too fast to be done on any other basis than credit. I might buy something from you at 10am and sell it to someone else at 11am. I do this on the expectation that over the next day or two we can figure out who really owns what and get that to them. In other words, trades today are contingent on the traders being around tomorrow and for a few more days. So when some of the traders go under, lots of other traders are put in jeopardy.
These three things combine in a nasty way. Since people can’t afford their homes they must submit to foreclosure or declare bankruptcy. But if they do either of these things, their mortgage “ends,” it disappears. This means that the banks that hold these mortgages have to remove them from their asset listings, which means they may lose their good standing with other banks. So banks go under. But banks work together, so now lots of banks are in jeopardy.
There are many ways to address this problem. Each of the candidate’s offers their own. They are, not surprisingly, quite consistent with the philosophy of their candidacise:
John McCain: John McCain is running on the Reagan philosophy of “free markets” with limited government intervention. His proposal — let the private sector work it out. This policy can be criticized as having the typical pitfall of Reaganomics — it makes the less fortunate suffer. But this misses the point. Fair or not, this approach no longer makes sense. The globally inter-dependent economy of 2008, the one which developed in part because of the Reagan revolution, will not respond the way the Carter economy of 1980 might have. If banks aren’t discouraged from coupling, they will do more of it. Foreclosures on individuals with Fed bailouts for banks is precisely the outcome banks seek when they issue questionable debt — let the borrower pay consequences, but not us.
To follow this policy, then, is to make many citizens suffer and encourage another bubble on the same basis. This is the McCain presidency — more of what got us here. Four years of time that could be used to update our nation wasted proving to ourselves that update really is desperately needed (see my post here).
Hillary Clinton: Hillary Clinton is running on a “I’m going to fight for you” philosophy. The basic idea is that the world is a zero sum game of winners and losers, good and evil people, parties, constituents etc. Her goal is to make sure that when a crisis emerges we, Hillary supporters, get the “wins” and some other group takes the “losses.” In the caes of the mortgage crisis, home-owners should get the “wins” and “bad banks” should take the losses. She is not naive. She is not suggesting there will be a lot to win. Her point is about relative, not absolute, gains — whatever wins and losses are to be had, bad guys should lose more and win less than the good guys.
Her policy is thus impose restrictions on what potential good guys would have to pay or give up — limiting foreclosures and interest rates — and what potential bad guys could gain — freezing interest rates, cracking down on predatory lending. This policy mitigates the pain and unfairness of the current manifestation of the problem but does nothing to address the underlying cause. It treats the symptom rather than the disease and so shifts the problem elsewhere, we just don’t know exactly where. People still can’t pay their mortgages, and banks still need them on their balance sheets. If you force interest rates down low enough for people to pay or eliminate foreclosure for the long term, the banks holdings are still in jeopardy and the banking crisis is still upon us, though now without mass evictions.
This is not a crazy strategy. It shifts the burden of the crisis into the entire system. The American economy as a whole will take a hit instead of those home-owners specifically. Perhaps this is what we need and deserve, but it does nothing to prevent a future crisis operating in the same fashion.
Barack Obama: Obama’s candidacy is based on bringing people together to talk. He believes that by sharing reasons, information and concerns we can find workable solutions where there appear to be none. The key to executing such a strategy is to compel all parties to get at the core of their concerns, i.e., to get away from the bluster of their demands, what they think or feel they want, and get down to the real basis of their needs, what they cannot reasonably be expected to yield.
As is often the case, the needs of the parties are apparent in the core cause of the problem. People can’t afford their mortgages but banks need them to keep paying for them. Foreclosures are bad for everyone, then, but are the only alternative banks have if people cannot pay. Obama’s proposal addresses this specifically. By sending mortgages to bankruptcy court for re-negotiation, homeowners will be able to keep their homes and banks will receive some, though not all, of the money they were owed. Homeowners will give up other things — credit rating, perhaps other items bought on credit — but they keep their houses, they do not become homeless. Banks lose short term cash but get to keep the value of the mortgage on their balance sheet — the homeowner is still paying off the same principal.
Like so many of his policies, Barack’s plan is not radically different from Hillary’s in terms of immediate outcome. They both reduce foreclosures and the flow of payments to banks. The difference is in their influence on the longer term evolution of this problem and the economy as a whole. Hillary’s plan gives banks the incentive to game the system yet again. If interest rates are frozen and foreclosures temporarily not permitted, the markets have clear barriers around which to adapt new exploitative strategies. They can, for example, refuse to issue new mortgages unless they receive some kind of government kickback to make it worth their while.
Obama’s plan hits the issue at its core — the parties can work something out becaues they both need the same thing. They just have to give up some of the other things they want.
March 29, 2008 at 1:56 am
It seems like the use of complicated derivatives that leveraged banks’ positions and made them susceptible to poorly quantified degrees of risk is part of the problem. I find it disturbing that even at this point there seems to be uncertainty as to how much money banks have the potential to lose. Does addressing derivatives need to be part of the solution? I vaguely remember that even with Enron complicated financial instruments were used to hide actions that normally would have been considered too risky.
March 29, 2008 at 3:11 pm
You are right that, at a basic level, derivatives have lead banks to become confused about what risks they’ve really taken. I’m still thinking about this (Seth and I chatted for 3 hrs yesterday about this). It’s complicated.
I see this as a problem of institutional cognition rather than individual cognition. The rules and practices by which investments are evaluated are not up to date with the way they behave. The problem is institutional rather than individual because individuals can know that an asset is mis-priced or a risk wrongly assessed, but in an interdependent financial world they can’t justify this cognition. You and I can both know something is junk but institutional rules can compel us to buy it.
This is why regulation of markets is so tricky. Regulations address certain abuses but create inter-dependencies that provide incentives for others. For example, according to a lecture from a derivatives expert I saw the other night, CMO’s became popular because low interest rates forced big money mgrs, e.g. pension funds, to seek high return debt. But pension funds aren’t allowed to buy just any debt, they have to conform to a variety of regulatory rules. In this case, mortgages qualified in a way that other things wouldn’t. So they were demanding “high return mortgages,” which meant someone needed to supply high risk mortgages, and that’s what they gave them.
In this case, my guess is we would have been better off if there were no such thing provided. Pension funds would have lost money, the market would have gone down and the American consumer would have been forced to cut back. We would have had a legit recession. Instead, CMO’s stepped in to plug the gap. I’m not sure right now if this is a fundamental problem of derivatives or some other aspect of our system.
March 31, 2008 at 9:11 am
Another touted difference between the Clinton and Obama positions is whether there should be a foreclosure “freeze” of any length of time. Clinton raised this issue in a number of debates as a contrast between her and Obama (she wants a 90-day freeze and he has not sought any freeze). I think it typifies the campaign styles Drew outlined above.
On the surface, freezing foreclosures is attractive to the hard scrabble voters Clinton has been courting. It sounds good to say that you won’t lose your home for three whole months while we, the DC thinkers, “figure things out.” In debates, Obama has looked a little distant and aloof when he then responds that he does not support a freeze–it makes him look like he doesn’t “care” about that sector of the electorate. I hope when this is raised in the upcoming PA debate–it certainly will be an issue–Obama is more assertive with pointing out the flaws with a freeze.
A few that come to mind of the legion: (a) What can be “figured out” between late January 2009 and April 2009 that can’t be analyzed now? If you say you are in the “solutions business,” then come up with one rather than tabling the issue. (b) Drew’s analysis hits on a theme that has come across in many postings–personal accountability and responsibility. Obama’s plan is not a “bail out”–folks and banks who went out on a limb will have to work things out themselves (with supervision) to realistically share the downside of their joint risk. I think such an approach would appeal to moderates and republicans who would (or should) be suspect of a government-centrist solution. (c) Adrian’s comment hits on a third problem with any solution that relieves players of ultimate responsibility–moral hazard. And (d), if nothing else, Obama should be able to get some mileage out of the fact that a wide range of economic thinkers have stated that a foreclosure freeze would cause “global chaos,” “result in higher rates and scarcer credits for borrowers [after the freeze],” and is otherwise “one of the truly bad ideas of our time.”