I had an experience recently that demonstrates the flaw in our for-profit healthcare system. As part of the prenatal care for my wife’s pregnancy, our doctor recommended that I take genetic screening tests for diseases that have elevated frequency amongst Ashkenazi Jews. Even though my wife is not Jewish, the doctor suggested this was worth doing. She suggested that if I came up positive on anything they could then test my wife for only that condition(s).
I mentioned that I was unsure whether my USC student health plan (provided by Anthem Blue Cross) would cover these tests. Our doctor told us the tests would cost around $250. We decided to go ahead with the tests.
When we received the explanation of benefits I noticed something odd. The tests did indeed cost about $250, but I was not billed $250 directly for $250 worth of tests. Rather, the explanation of benefits showed that the tests cost about $2500 — or roughly 10 times what my doctor had suggested and what I finally paid.
Of this $2500, approximately $1400 was knocked off for “patient savings.” In other words, it appears that Anthem has a deal with Genzyme, the testing company, such that Anthem subscribers pay a substantially discounted price. The remaining $1100 was then the amount that Genzyme was to collect. I paid $50 to cover the remainder of my deductible, leaving $1050 to be paid. They paid 80% of the remainder and I was to pay 20% as co-payment.
All’s well that ends well, right? I paid what I thought I would pay ($250). No, actually. While I ended up paying a fair price for this service, the way this price was calculated indicates a significant source of unfairness in the system. Specifically, it is very likely that Anthem paid little or nothing on my behalf for these tests.
Anthem and Genzyme have an ongoing relationship that includes a contract and numerous transactions. This makes it possible for them to manipulate the pricing of services such that patients pay the bulk, if not the entirety of the actual costs. Furthermore, in our for-profit healthcare system, it is a responsibility of these companies to engage in this kind of price manipulation. Since price manipulation allows Anthem to avoid paying claims, they are doing a disservice to their shareholders if they do not engage in this practice.
How does price manipulation work? It’s pretty simple. Let’s say the cost of the tests really is $250. That is, Genzyme wants $250 to run these tests — that is the price at which they supply the tests.
Without price manipulation (and excluding the $50 deductible to make things easier to calculate), payments would work like this:
- Total Cost = $250
- Anthem pays 80% of $250 = $200, leaving $50 to pay
- I pay the $50.
- Thus Genzyme receives $250, I pay $50, Anthem pays $200
But if Anthem is innovative and looking out for its shareholders, there’s an easy way for them to increase profits by avoiding having to pay the $200. Anthem can create an arrangement with Genzyme as follows…
Genzyme declares the cost of the tests to be much larger than the actual cost, let’s say $2500. This is the “sticker price” of the service. This sticker price is arbitrary but uniform across all insurance plans offered by Anthem or any other company. The sticker price is “arbitrary” in that since no one ever pays it, it can be set anywhere.
For each insurance plan offered by Anthem, Genzyme and Anthem negotiate a “discount” to the sticker price such that Genzyme’s actual price, $250, is what Genzyme ends up receiving from me, the patient. Thus, if my plan asks me to pay 20% of the total cost, subscribers to my plan receive a “discount”off the sticker price such that the billed cost is equal to 5 times ( 1 / 20%) the actual cost. In other words:
- Actual cost = $250 (what Genzyme wants)
- Genzyme gives a discount such that 20% of the billed cost = the actual cost, 20 % x billed cost = $250.
- Working backward, 20 % x billed = $250, so $250/20% = billed cost = $1250
- So they want the bill to show $1250. So they set the discount such that the arbitrary sticker – discount = $1250
- So $2500 (sticker) – $1250 (discount) = $1250 (billed).
- This $1250 (billed) x 20% = $250 (paid by me).
- So all told, Genzyme receives $250, I pay $250, Anthem pays $0.
This can easily be calculated for any plan. For example, if according to a different Anthem plan the patient only pays 10%, then there is no discount — the billed cost is equal to the sticker price ($2500). Take 10% and the patient’s responsibility = $250. Again, Genzyme gets $250, patient pays $250, Anthem pays $0.
Thus, with some elementary math and a bit of foresight, Anthem can avoid paying any money for a portion if its claims. This scheme will work for any service which I, the patient, will not reject on the basis of the price I have to pay. As long as I am willing to pay Genzyme’s price, there is no need for Anthem to pay anything. Thus, for any service or procedure that is non-elective, Anthem does not have to pay and the service provider will get their desired price. And for any procedure that is elective but not too expensive, Anthem does not have to pay and the service provider will get their desired price. Anthem will only have to pay when there is an elective procedure that the service provider charges more than I would pay. In these cases, I won’t buy the service unless Anthem makes up the gap.
Using such a scheme is basic, rational economics. Any executives who are earning their bonuses ought to have already implemented such systems. Thus, if Anthem is being competently run, they should be paying for only a small portion of the total claims. They should be collecting fees but not providing insurance.
This may suggest a potential glitch. If Anthem is not paying claims, won’t this show up in their books? I pay $250, Genzyme gets $250, but the bill was for $1250. How do Genzyme and Anthem account for the $1000 that Genzyme claims Anthem owes but that Anthem doesn’t really pay (because Genzyme doesn’t really want it). Wouldn’t this come up in auditing? In other words, it appears that this would look illegal. There’s a “phantom charge” of $1000 that never gets paid.
These appearances can be easily reconfigured to be perfectly ok. If Genzyme pays Anthem a general, scheduled “fee” to be a participant in Anthem’s plans, then Anthem can “pay” Genzyme by deducting the phantom charge from this fee. Let’s say Genzyme agrees to pay Anthem $50,000 a year to be a participant. When I order my test and Anthem is required to pay $1000 by virtue of the calculations above, they simply book the $1000 against the $50,000. That is, Anthem tells Genzyme they have “already paid” $1000 of their $50,000, leaving only $49,000 remaining. Anthem books the expense against receivables and Genzyme books the revenue against payables. That is just the most direct way. There are an almost infinite number of ways to account for such phantom payments through the invention of meaningless categories, departments and programs into which these fees can be allocated.
The key factor facilitating these games is that fact that neither Genzyme nor Anthem needs to exchange any funds. Genzyme wants their money — I pay it to them. Anthem wants their money, I (or my employer) pays them. Since neither party needs money to change hands, the goal of this “participation fee” is simply to account for the phantom fees. The participation fee is just there to serve as a disguise so that it is not obvious that the entire cost of the service is being passed to the consumer. Technically, at any given point in time, one of the two companies owes the other company money on the basis of the tally of participation fees. But this money never needs to be paid. The balance can just be carried over to the next month, year etc. As long as this fee is set reasonably close to the expected number of transactions, the fee will balance out over time. If the fees start to accumulate too far out of balance, they re-negotiate.
What I’ve described is hardly novel. These kind of arrangements are common in industries where one company is a broker between an individual consumer and another company. Such arrangements exploit the “information asymmetry” between the consumer — who is receiving a service for the first time and likely only one or two times in their life — and the companies — who have a regularized relationship that persists over numerous transactions. In these cases, the consumer will believe almost any quoted price, regardless how distorted, provided what they actually have to pay is not too high. Meanwhile, the “distortion” of the quoted price can be balanced against a second distortion (the participation fee). Since the two companies have many repeat transactions, they can set these two distortions against one another and they will balance out over time.
Furthermore, given that this information asymmetry exists, it is the responsibility of publicly traded corporations to exploit it. That is, if the executives of Anthem are earning their bonuses, they ought to be doing this. If they’re not, they’re not maximizing profit. They’re missing an opportunity.
In sum, I hope the preceding has made plain three things people should be concerned about:
1) If you are a consumer, i.e. you have private health insurance: your insurance company might be making you pay for the full, or a very large portion of the full, cost of the services you receive while pretending to insure you against phantom fees. Thus, you might be over-paying.
2) If you are a shareholder, i.e. you own stock in a private health insurance company: your insurance company might not be making its customers pay for the full, or a very large portion of the full, cost of the services they receive while pretending to insure them against phantom fees. Thus, you might be under-earning.
3) If you are an American citizen: your healthcare system has a contradiction. Either consumers are over-paying or shareholders are under-earning. That is, the market conditions (information asymmetries) insist that insurance companies collect revenue without providing services.
This is just one example.